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OPINION: PROCEEDINGS 
1:56 p.m. 
CHIEF mSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument next in No.87-1167, Price 
Waterhouse v. Ann B. Hopkins. 
Ms. Oberly, you may begin whenever you're ready. 
ORAL ARGUMENT OF KATHRYN A.OBERLY ON BEHALF OF THE 
PETITIONER 
MS.OBERLY: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 
This is a challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to Price Waterhouse's decision 
not to make Respondent a partner in the firm. 
The District Court in this case, after a five-day trial, found that Price Waterhouse had 
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for that decision. 
The District Court also found that Respondent failed to prove that those reasons were a 
pretext for discrimination. Under this Court's Title VII decisions, including the ones that 
have been discussed in the last hour, those findings should have resulted in a judgment 
for Price Waterhouse. 
But then something inexplicable [*2] happened in the District Court's reasoning. After 
making the findings that should have ended the case in favor of Price Waterhouse, the 
District Court went on to hold that three factors, each of which was innocent by itself, 
somehow combined to produce a Title VII violation in this case. 
None of those factors was found to be evidence of intentional discrimination, or evidence 
that discrimination had in fact caused Respondent any injury. 
But the District Court nevertheless concluded that Price Waterhouse violated Title VII 
because the firm failed to take affirmative steps to purge or purify its decision-making 
process of an unquantifiable, unconscious, and unintentional element of sex stereotyping. 
This finding of a tainted process at Price Waterhouse led the District Court to 
characterize the case as one involving mixed motives for the employment decision. 
On that basis of the mixed motive characterization, the Court then held that it became 
Price Waterhouse's burden to prove, and to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that 
its decision would have been the same even if the process hadn't been tainted. 
QUESTION: As you put it, the District Court must have -- ifthere was a [*3] mixed 
motive, didn't it necessarily find that one of the reasons for the refusal was, was gender 
based? 
MS.OBERLY: Justice White, that's the part of the opinion that I frankly find 
inexplicable, and somewhat I like an O'Henry novel, because he first found all the factors 
that should have resulted in Price Waterhouse's winning this case. 
He then found that he was unable to conclude what role the supposedly illegitimate 
motive played in the decision. He didn't say it played a significant role. He didn't say it 
played a substantial role. He said it played an undefined role. 
QUESTION: Well then, I'd better wait until you tell me what the Court of Appeals did. 
MS.OBERLY: I'll tell you now that the Court of Appeals affirmed it. But I'll come back 
to that. 
QUESTION: You interpret an undefined role to mean some role? 
MS. OBERLY: Yes. 
QUESTION: Or--
MS. OBERLY: Yes, I interpret it to mean some role. 
QUESTION: Some role. 
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MS.OBERLY: And I also interpret, as I'll be arguing to the Court, that some role is not 
enough to satisfy the Plaintiffs burden in this case, that at a minimum it has to be a 
significant or a substantial role, and that the District Court was unable to make those [*4] 
findings on the record in this case. 
QUESTION: Well, you argue for some "but for" standard of causation? Or are you 
willing to settle for a, substantial factor? 
MS.OBERLY: Choosing between those labels, we argue for a "but for" standard. 
But I actually think that all of the labels of causation floating around in this case, 
including those supplied by the Solicitor General, just add an element of confusion to 
what to me is a relatively straightforward question. 
QUESTION: Well, what, what is the liability situation in a case when there are two 
independently sufficient causes for a particular employer's action, either one of which 
would be sufficient in and of itself, and one of which is an illegitimate reason, such as 
racial or gender discrimination? 
MS. OBERLY: Then the situation we have, Justice O'Connor, is basically who wins in 
the case of a tie? Who wins if the District Court, as was the case here, is unable to decide 
which motive actually caused the decision? And our position on that issue is that the 
answer has to be for the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff brought this case, and if the Plaintiff can't prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and we don't suggest that she be held [*5] to any higher standard than 
preponderance, even though she would hold us to a clear and convincing standard, if she 
can't show by a preponderance that the discriminatory motive actually caused the result 
she's complaining about, then there's no sound reason either in policy or in this Court's 
prior precedence for holding that the employer has violated the law. 
Because you have on the other side of the ledger an overwhelming proof, accepted by the 
District Court here, that the employer acted for legitimate reasons. 
And you have throughout both the language and the legislative history of Title VII, you 
have starting with the language, you have Congress saying, it is only unlawful for an 
employer to act because of a prohibited reason. 
You have the legislative history which shows that the opponents of the bill were 
extremely concerned that the statute was going to cut much too deeply into employers' 
traditional freedom to make employment decisions for any reason they wanted to, as long 
as it wasn't a prohibited reason. 
The effect of the Court of Appeals' mixed motive analysis, which basically awards the tie 
to the plaintiff in a case where you can't decide what the cause was. 
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QUESTION: [*6] Well, you tell us you don't like labels, but it seems to me we have to 
use labels at times in order to describe to District and trial courts what they should do, 
and that the answer you have just given to Justice O'Connor is that the Plaintiff must 
show "but for" causation. 
MS. OBERLY: Ifwe need a label, that is the answer I would give. 
But I submit that for district courts and litigants to actually trying this case, or this type of 
case, the much simpler formulation is to say to those parties and to the Court, the 
question you're looking at is did the prohibitive motive make a difference? That's the 
same as "but for" causation. 
QUESTION: Well, maybe the meaning. Maybe the meaning, though, and maybe what 
lower courts have done in ifthere are two reasons established, one legitimate, one 
illegitimate, maybe the burden shifts to the employer at that stage to do something. 
MS. OBERLY: That --
QUESTION: Maybe not by clear and convincing evidence, but maybe to do something. 
Maybe then the burden shifts to the employer. Is that what the --
MS. OBERLY: That is certainly what the --
QUESTION: Solicitor General is suggesting? 
MS. OBERLY: I think that's what the Solicitor General is [*7] suggesting. It's certainly 
what the Court of Appeals held in this case. 
We find that there are numerous problems with that approach. The first one is before we 
even get to who has the burden, we have a substantive question of what is the standard of 
liability under Title VIL Is it "but for" causation? It is causation that made a difference to 
the outcome? 
If that's the case, then this Court's Title VII decisions hold, then it always remains the 
plaintiffs burden. It never shifts on the plaintiffs burden to show that she was the victim 
of intentional discrimination. 
If she can't establish causation, in other words if she can't establish that the action she's 
challenging has caused by the prohibitive motive, then there's no sound reason 
compatible with Title VII's purposes to give the judgment to her. 
So that what you're doing, one of the phrases, besides the many different causation labels 
floating around in this case, one of the phrases that also permeates the case is the notion 
that the employer in this situation is a "proven wrongdoer." And I think that's in part the 
question you're asking. 
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But I would point out that the employer in this case is simultaneously a proven right [* 8] 
doer, if you will. In other words, the Court has found that the employer has acted at least 
as much for a legitimate motive, which Congress clearly didn't intend to punish, as it has 
for an illegitimate motive. 
And again, I come back to it being the Plaintiffs burden to bring the ball over the 50-yard 
line. If she can't, show by a preponderance of the evidence that the prohibitive motive 
caused the injury she's suing to redress, then it's quite unclear why you are awarding her a 
judgment --
QUESTION: Well, there's language in a number of cases out there that it's enough to 
show that the discriminatory reason was a substantial factor. 
MS. OBERLY: There this, that language appears, and in this Court's cases I think it 
doesn't translate to the Title VII setting. 
In this Court's cases it appears in two cases, the Transportation Management case and the 
Mt. Healthy case. 
Neither of those cases dealt with either Title VII-specific language or with the legislative 
history of Title VII, which shows extensive Congressional debate about, on the one hand 
preserve, making sure that employers were not allowed to act for prohibited reasons but 
at the same time ensuring employers complete freedom [*9] to make employment 
decisions based on any other reason than a prohibited reason. 
And what the Court of Appeals analysis does here by resorting to significant factor or 
motivating factor, as opposed to "but for" causation, is allow a plaintiff to establish 
liability even though the record also establishes that the employer acted for a perfectly 
legitimate reason. 
The second problem besides the distinction between Title VII and the other two cases of 
this Court, which didn't address Title VII's history and language, is that Transportation 
Management, for example, was in my view purely an agency deference case. 
The Court upheld the significant factor and then burden-shifting approach in that case, 
because the Board, the National Labor Relations Board, presented that to the Court as its 
interpretation of its own statute. 
The Court simultaneously said that it would have been perfectly acceptable, and perfectly 
plausible and reasonable and something the Court would have upheld, had the Court, had 
the Board taken the position under the NLRA that we take here under Title VII. 
Essentially, the Court said it was a matter for the Board's discretion, and it was unwilling 
to overturn the policy [* 1 O] judgment that the Board had made in that case. But none of 
that bears on how Title VII should be interpreted. 
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And then a final factor that makes this case quite different from Transportation 
Management and Mt. Healthy is that in those cases, as you've noted, at least the 
triggering predicate for shifting the burden was a finding that the prohibited motive was 
either a substantial or a significant or a motivating factor in the decision. 
Here we don't even have that. Here we have the District Court saying that at most this 
was an undefined -- the prohibited motive played an undefined role, an unquantifiable 
role. 
We don't have a finding that it was a significant factor. We have the Court of Appeals 
saying that it was a significant factor, but the Court of Appeals wasn't the one hearing the 
evidence and making the findings. 
QUESTION: It interpreted the District Court's opinion and findings . 
MS.OBERLY: One can, as I have read the District Court's opinion --
QUESTION: Isn't that what the Court did, the Court of Appeals? 
MS. OBERLY: The Court of Appeals took, made findings, which is in its role, that the 
District Court never made. The District Court --
QUESTION: Should we, should [* 11] we judge this case on the basis of, are we 
reviewing the Court of Appeals or the District Court? 
MS. OBERLY: You obviously are reviewing the Court of Appeals' judgment. But to the 
extent that the the Court --
QUESTION: And, I take it that part of what it based its judgment on was its 
understanding of the facts as found by the District Court that there was --
MS. OBERLY: We're not asking --
QUESTION: That there was a mixed motive, and that there was an unacceptable, 
something unacceptable caused the -- contributed to this refusal. 
MS. OBERLY: Contributed to, that's, Justice white, that is a significant and crucial 
difference between contributed to and caused the decision. 
And although this starts off --
QUESTION: Well, what ifl put it part of the cause for the decision? 
MS.OBERLY: Part of the cause is not enough, if the decision would have been the same 
in any event. Part of the cause is some factor, some role --
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QUESTION: So then I take it you agree that we should review the case on the basis that 
the Court of Appeals at least found that part of the cause was, and then you say, well, that 
isn't enough. Is that what we --
MS.OBERLY: That's correct. It's not enough under[* 12] the Court's own prior cases 
that have addressed similar issues under different statutes. Or under the Constitution. 
Part of the cause skips the causal link that we contend is essential between the action the 
Plaintiff is challenging and what actually happened to her in this case. 
I'd like to back up for a moment, because although these burden of proof and burden-
shifting issues are quite significant, there is in this case a fundamental threshold question 
of whether this even is a mixed motive case in the first place. 
And before the Court wrestles with the difficult burden-shifting issues, it's quite 
important that it understand the consequences as applied by the Court of Appeals of 
attaching the mixed motive label to any particular case. 
In this case, we have overwhelming evidence, accepted by the District Court, not 
overturned by the Court of Appeals, of a legitimate motive in Price Waterhouse's favor. 
The evidence showed, the District Court found, and the Court of Appeals did not 
disagree, that from the very beginning of Respondent's tenure at Price Waterhouse there 
were significant problems in her ability to get along with staff and peers. 
The evidence further shows that she [* 13] was warned about those problems, that she 
was told she needed to correct them, that she agreed she needed to correct them. But at 
the time of the partnership decision in this case she had not in fact taken any action to 
correct them at all. 
So the issue in this case really wasn't, should Ann Hopkins be made a partner, but should 
Ann Hopkins either be rejected outright or placed on hold for future consideration? 
We basically don't have in this case enough evidence of the type that the Court had in 
Transportation Management or in Mt. Healthy to characterize this as a mixed motive 
case. 
All that we have on Respondent's side of the ledger, on the illegitimate motive side of the 
ledger, is a few isolated comments, virtually all of them sex neutral, virtually all of them 
from her supporters, that psychologist characterized as the product of stereotype thinking. 
We don't in this case deny that there were a few sex-based comments about Respondent, 
and that those comments were probably inappropriate. But they simply don't shed any 
light on the existence of a mixed motive in this case. 
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QUESTION: Well, Ms. Oberly, do you say that the comments by partners about women, 
past women candidates, [*14] and also evidence about the way in which the employer 
system was structured, are irrelevant to a showing of discriminatory motive? 
MS. OBERLY: No, Your Honor. They clearly would be relevant evidence. But they don't 
in this case amount to supplying what's crucial, which is the causal link between the 
comments and the action that happened, that the firm took in the case of Ann Hopkins. 
The comments come from the supporters, the comments that are criticized as stereotypes 
come from her supporters. They come from men who wanted her to become a partner in 
this firm. There's no linkage between those comments. 
First of all, it takes a great leap of imagination to say that stereotype comments, even if 
inappropriate, from people who wanted her to become a partner, somehow hurt her. 
And the Court of Appeals was unable to make that conclusion. The Court of Appeals 
said, we can't tell that those comments hurt her. The Court of Appeals instead took those 
comments of evidence, as evidence of discrimination in the process. 
That we submit is discrimination in the air. That doesn't mean that the discrimination 
didn't touch the plaintiff when you talk about discrimination in the air, it may well [*15] 
have touched the plaintiff. But there's no causal connection between the comments and 
Hopkins' fate at Price Waterhouse. 
QUESTION: Did anybody testify to that? 
MS. OBERLY: Pardon? 
QUESTION: Did anybody testify that that was not the policy? 
MS.OBERLY: Price Waterhouse put on evidence that its policy was non-discriminatory. 
QUESTION: Did anybody say that those specific statements made by people in authority 
were not the statements of Price Waterhouse? 
MS.OBERLY: The record is quite clear, Justice Marshall, that the statements that are 
being criticized here were not the statements of the ultimate decision makers. 
QUESTION: Where is that, what does the record say? 
MS. OBERLY: The record shows an elaborate process, so I can't give you one page. 
QUESTION: The record, the record at no place says that those statements were untrue. 
MS. OBERLY: You mean that they weren't made? We agree they were made. 
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QUESTION: That they were untrue. Is there anything in the statement, in the record that 
says those statements were untrue? 
MS.OBERLY: I'm not -- you need to help by telling me which statements you're 
referring to. 
QUESTION: Well, was there any statement in the record that said that[* 16] she didn't 
have to be less macho. 
MS.OBERLY: I'm not aware of -- there probably isn't. But that's not the point here. 
The point is that that statement --
QUESTION: But it's my point, if you don't mind. 
MS. OBERLY: I understand it's your point. But my point is that that statement was made 
by someone who wanted her to become a partner. 
QUESTION: But is there anything --
MS.OBERLY: And the statement, I would like to focus, Justice Marshall, for a minute 
on the negative comments, on the comments from opponents of Ann Hopkins, which are 
the ones that were characterized by the expert in this case as being the product of 
stereotype thinking. 
Those comments, which reflect --
QUESTION: Is there anything that says that Price Waterhouse would consider her better 
if she had her hair done? 
MS.OBERLY: It's clear, Your Honor, we've covered that thoroughly in our brief, that 
that comment was made by her strongest supporter in the firm, after the fact, after the 
decision was made in this case, that however ill-advised it may have been, and I 
personally regard it as an inappropriate comment, but however ill-advised it may have 
been it was his personal reaction to her situation. And there [* 17] is no linkage between 
that comment and the ultimate decision made about her. He was not the ultimate decision 
maker. 
QUESTION: Same time, practically. 
MS. OBERLY: Pardon? 
QUESTION: It came practically at the same --
MS.OBERLY: No, it came after the decision had been made. 
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QUESTION: It did, but it was how long after? 
MS. OBERLY: I think a matter of months. Maybe somewhat less than that. 
QUESTION: Much less than that. 
QUESTION: Isn't the point, Ms. Oberly, that the statement, although not indicating the 
point of, the frame of mind of the person who made the statement, is taken by your 
opponents as evidence of the fact that this reveals the kind of thinking that went into the 
decisional process and this was more or less as an explanation of how this unfortunate 
thing happened? 
MS. OBERLY: That's certainly--
QUESTION: That's their argument. 
MS. OBERLY: That's their characterization of what was happening. But what they're 
confusing, I think, is the type of case she brought with an entirely different case that she 
didn't bring, she didn't try, that the District Court never heard, and the Court of Appeals 
didn't review. And isn't before this Court either. 
She brought a case [* 18] challenging disparate treatment in her individual situation. The 
focus of that kind of case under this Court's precedence is on the particular employment 
decision about her. 
If she'd wanted, and this evidence is relevant, the evidence you're talking about is 
relevant to a different type of case. If she'd wanted to attack the decision-making process 
at Price Waterhouse, there were a number of other ways she could have proceeded. 
The most obvious would have been a case under Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII. That 
section focuses on employment practices that deprive, or tend to deprive, employees of 
opportunities without limiting the focus to a specific employment decision made about 
the particular plaintiff bringing the suit. 
If she'd brought that type of case it would have been --
QUESTION: I understand that. But supposing the case she did bring, the trier of fact was 
persuaded that nobody really deliberately, intentionally wanted to disfavor female 
applicants for partnership, but that unconsciously there was this threat of stereotype 
thinking that may have affected the decisional process, and in her case was critical, even 
though it was not deliberate. Would she prevail or not? [* 19] 
MS. OBERLY: I'd have to first tell you that that isn't our case at all. We have no findings 
that this was critical. 
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QUESTION: I understand that. I understand that. 
MS. OBERLY: And we of course don't agree that gay have affected is a relevant 
causation standard. But taking all that away, then it's possible that she has a cause of 
action. But that's not the case, and it's not the --
QUESTION: So it's not a question of the, you're not really emphasizing the intentional 
factor in that --
MS.OBERLY: One of the key components of the case she brought, which is an 
individual plaintiff disparate treatment case, is intent. 
QUESTION: Right. 
MS. OBERLY: She didn't prove intent. If she had brought the case I was describing 
under Section 703(a)(2), where she challenged the decision-making process at Price 
Waterhouse, it would not have been necessary for her to show intentional discrimination 
at the liability stage. 
It would have been sufficient for her to establish that there was a tainted process at work, 
and then you would have a separate inquiry into whether she in particular or if she 
brought a class action any other members of class, were entitled to relief, because they 
themselves [*20) had been harmed by the process. 
But she didn't bring a process case --
QUESTION: Well, you don't deny that showing a tainted process is certainly relevant to 
the disparate treatment case. 
MS.OBERLY: It's relevant, but it's --
QUESTION: You're just saying it's not enough to get you over the hill. 
MS.OBERLY: That's correct. It's like, it's very much like the Court's case at the end of 
last term in Watson, where there was evidence of substantial racial stereotyping, which 
the Court said may not have been enough to prove a disparate, an intentional disparate 
treatment case, but may in fact have been quite relevant to proving a case under Section 
703(a)(2) of disparate impact attacking the fairness of the employer's subjective decision-
making process. 
Plaintiff, or Respondent, could have brought that type of case here, and she, and the 
evidence we're talking about would have been relevant in that type of case. 
We're not focusing here on simply a technical pleading defect, saying she pled the wrong 
subsection of the statute. The problem is much bigger than that, because no one knew 
until her brief in this Court, which is the first time that Section 703(a)(2) has ever been 
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mentioned [*21] in this litigation, that we were litigating a process case that not only 
focused on the employment decision about her but purported to be an indictment of Price 
Waterhouse's entire decision-making process. 
If that type of case is to be brought, then obviously you need something that didn't 
happen in the District Court. You need a focused and fair and full inquiry into the 
fairness of Price Waterhouse's entire decision-making process. 
If she succeeds in proving, she or someone else succeeds in proving a tainted decision-
making process, it may well be that at that point specific relief, such as an injunction or a 
declaratory judgment, might be appropriate. 
But here we're talking about a plaintiff who is unable, who brings an individual disparate 
treatment case, who is unable to establish that the conduct she challenges actually caused 
the results she's complaining about, and yet she nevertheless claims that she's entitled at 
least to a liability judgment, and to some sort of partial relief, such as an injunction, 
declaratory judgment, and attorneys' fees, even though she can't make the necessary 
causal link. 
QUESTION: What do we do with the Court of Appeals' statement that Hopkins [*22] 
demonstrated and the District Court found that she was treated less favorably than male 
candidates because of her sex? 
MS. OBERLY: The District Court, in fact, didn't find that. The District Court rejected --
QUESTION: I know. But this is what the Court of Appeals says, and that's the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of the District Court's findings. And that's, that's just one of 
several places where the Court of Appeals says this. 
MS.OBERLY: The Court of Appeals says that repeatedly, Your Honor. But if you're 
looking at the findings, they come only from the District Court. The District Court, he 
expressly rejects --
QUESTION: I know, but the Court of Appeals would have had to have found -- was 
looking at the judgment below, the facts from the standpoint of whether they were clearly 
erroneous. 
MS.OBERLY: Well, the Court of Appeals was drawing its own legal conclusions on the 
same facts that the District Court said, don't support the claim you just read. 
The District Court specifically rejected the notion that she had established a claim 
showing she was treated differently than comparably situated men. The District Court 
specifically rejected a claim that, based on her introduction [*23] of statistical evidence 
to show that she was treated differently, that women in general were treated differently 
than men at Price waterhouse. 
12 
So that, to take findings which clearly are the province of the District Court and have the 
Court of Appeals elevate them into something that the District Court never found doesn't 
QUESTION: So you suggest we make our own judgment on what the --
MS. OBERLY: I suggest that when you're looking --
QUESTION: What the District Court said or found, I guess we're supposed to anyway. 
Aren't we? 
MS. OBERLY: When you're looking for findings, you will find them in the District 
Court's opinion. And for the Court of Appeals to characterize them as something other 
than the District Court found does not turn them into findings. 
The final issue in this case, which I'll just devote a minute to and then save the minute of 
my time for rebuttal, is simply the Court of Appeals' error in switching the burden of 
persuasion, if it's to be switched at all, to Price Waterhouse by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Respondent makes only a half-hearted attempt to defend that portion of the Court of 
Appeals' judgment, and with good reason. That standard is rarely [*24] invoked. 
It's certainly, to our knowledge, never been invoked to require a defendant to disprove a 
plaintiffs case. And the Court of Appeals here offered no explanation for departing from 
the normal preponderant standard. And certainly that aspect of the Court of Appeals' 
Judgment requires reversal. 
I'll save the remainder of my time. 
QUESTION: Thank you, Ms. Oberly. We'll hear now from you, Mr. Heller. 
ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES H. HELLER ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 
MR. HELLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 
I guess I had not expected to spend this much time on findings as I now think it's 
expected I should do. This Court has so often talked about not engaging in second-
guessing of the findings, and I don't think the Court of Appeals did that, even if it used 
slightly different language. 
But the District Judge in this case did, I think, a remarkably careful job, and I think 
unfortunately Ms. Oberly has rather scanted what the findings say. 
He found in the final order, which is on page 62 of the appendix to the petition, the 
discrimination caused in part a denial of this partnership. It did so because Price 
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Waterhouse did not protect the partnership evaluation [*25] process from stereotyped 
attitudes. 
Before he got to that he built very carefully the reason why it took three elements to find 
that Price waterhouse had done this with what is the equivalent of a corporate or a firm 
intent. 
QUESTION: Do you suppose that this finding as historical fact sort of saying that is 
subject to the clearly erroneous standard in the Court of Appeals? 
MR. HELLER: I would have thought it was subject to the clearly erroneous standard, and 
I will, I see very little mention of Anderson v. City of Bessemer City and Pullman v. 
Swint in the briefs either of the government, as a matter of fact, or of Price Waterhouse. 
Yes, we have thought all along that what, what we are perhaps being assailed for, or what 
Judge Gesell is being assailed for, is being careful in this case, not overstating what he 
found, that this is a classic mixed motives case. 
And unfortunately they don't subject themselves to the kind of analy is that the bean-
counting approach of the government's brief seems to suggest, because there is no way 
that votes get counted here. 
What happens is this is a process in which there is in effect a veto power in a relatively 
small group of objectors among [*26] the partners who comment on this, because that is 
what the policy committee takes note of. And we had that from the senior partner, Joseph 
Connor, when we took his deposition de bene esse. That is the decisive factor here. 
Using subjective standards, collegial decision-making, which is as hard to penetrate as 
the kind of legislative and administrative decision making that this Court talked about in 
the Arlington Heights case, Price Waterhouse relies very heavily and gives great weight 
and leverage to the comments of these partners. 
Now, the evidence that was given about what those comments mean is quite full, and it's 
all in the joint appendix. Not all of it. There are some obvious things. 
There is that comment about dressing more femininely, walking more femininely, 
walking more femininely. That's said by one of the two messengers in this case. That is 
the messenger from the policy board in the partnership, and that's what Judge Gesell 
found, to Ms. Hopkins. 
There is also another messenger who comes from the local office where she's being 
nominated to the policy board, and that was Roger Marcellin. And he's the man who said, 
I have no doubt that Tom Beyer, the man who made those [*27] remarks, knew exactly 
what to tell her, where the problems lay. That was in response to a question by the Judge, 
by the way. 
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But the predicate for this, "caused in part," and do think that that is really stronger than 
played a role or a motivating factor or a substantial factor, and I see no reason why any of 
those tests wouldn't work. 
One could even use the definition of material in the Kungys case as a natural tendency to 
influence the decision. 
But whatever, whatever formulation of that is used, here there was a finding that was 
caused in part and the predicate for that finding was a series of decisions, of statements in 
Judge Gesell's decision itself. 
He said, although the stereotyping by individual partners may have been unconscious on 
their part, the maintenance of a system that gave weight to such biased criticisms was a 
conscious act of the partnership as a whole. 
And he said then almost in the next sentence, and I'm reading at 56 and 57, the Plaintiff 
appears to have been a victim of emissive and subtle discrimination created by a system 
that made evaluations based on outmoded attitudes, that is stereotyping, determinative. 
Determinative. Hard to find a more decisive [*28] word. 
And then finally, before he went on to talk about mixed motives where he said again, 
discrimination played a role in the employment decision. 
Before he went on to say that, he said, the court finds that the policy board's decision not 
to admit the Plaintiff to partnership was tainted by discriminatory evaluations that were 
the direct result of its failure, the policy board's, to address the evident problem of sexual 
stereotyping in partnership evaluations. 
Now, this isn't a question of the 50-yard line. This is a question of two motives possibly 
playing a part, and what must the Plaintiff show. That we thought was the first main issue 
in this case. 
What we believe the Plaintiff must show is clearly marked by this Court's decisions. A 
motivating factor, a substantial factor. And Transportation Management, I believe, 
characterized Mt. Healthy as saying, played a role. 
This is if anything a statute which is --
QUESTION: Suppose an, suppose an employee gets his, gets reinstated on the basis of 
such a suit, having established that the dismissal was for a mixed motive, I assume that 
having won that wonderful victory the employee could thereupon immediately be retired 
for the [*29] valid reasons that, that were themselves self-sufficient. Wouldn't that 
follow? 
MR. HELLER: You might -- that certainly is possible. You might have the same case 
again, but you might have the retaliation problem as well. 
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QUESTION: Well, yes, but -- but in theory there is, it's a hollow victory, to get reinstated 
and say you, the effective factor was not necessarily unlawful. Take me back and fire me 
for the other effective factors, leaving out the unlawful one. 
MR. HELLER: That's a little bit, I think, Justice Scalia, that's a little bit like what the 
findings and testimony were about whether or not a partnership price, such as Price 
Waterhouse, really tries to control this sort of thing. 
If the courts give smart money or equitable relief because it has happened, it is not likely 
to happen again. We have no thought that Price Waterhouse, like other intelligent firms in 
this world, doesn't learn by its past mistakes and doesn't learn that this process as it was 
conducting it at the time of Ms. Hopkins' candidacy is really, is really just unacceptable. 
But, so I don't think, I think yes, in theory that can happen again. There can be a serial 
kind of mystery or murder story going [*30] on --
QUESTION: I wonder. Do you, do you agree with the, with the bottom line in the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals that if the employer nevertheless said, well, this 
was a mixed motive case, but the lawful motive was sufficient in itself and we would 
have denied this person a partnership anyway, following Mt. Healthy. Do you agree with 
that? 
MR. HELLER: Well, we agree that that is, we certainly agree that that is open to them. 
We have said that it should be a stronger burden of proof --
QUESTION: Well, nevertheless, it is open to them. 
MR. HELLER: There's no question. 
QUESTION: It's just not enough, it's just not enough in any particular case that it's a 
mixed motive case. 
MR. HELLER: Oh no. You don't win just because it's a mixed motive case. That gets you 
to --
QUESTION: Although there is some submissions in this case that indicate that that 
should be the standard. 
MR. HELLER: Well, we have not taken that position. We tried to distinguish between 
the liability stage and the relief stage. 
When you get to the relief stage, and 706(g) of the act we think is structured very clearly 
to say that, the second sentence just reeks of a defendant's responsibility to come [* 31] 
forward and say, that's not the reason we did it. We would have done it anyway. 
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The question I think there is whether it's to be clear --
QUESTION: And Mt. Healthy goes to liability, doesn't it? 
MR. HELLER: No. We think, we think in all fairness that it doesn't go to liability. They 
showed liability, they showed that there were two motives. 
Judge Gesell ended up saying there are two possible explanations for this, each of them 
may have caused it in part. At that point we think that the wording, the policy, the intent 
of Title VII, the dealings of the case --
QUESTION: Well, that's not what Mt. Healthy held. 
MR. HELLER: Mt. Healthy --
QUESTION: Mt. Healthy said there was no Constitutional violation if the employer 
could show that he would have fired the person for the non-Constitutional reason. 
MR. HELLER: That, that is true, in Mt. Healthy, that that is what Mt. Healthy held. 
But we think that it comes really at the remedy stage, because Title VII is very explicitly 
structured that way. And that's where it should come. That one does not simply say there 
are two possible factors, and therefore you lose. This is not a football game. Something 
has tended to deprive her of it. [*32] 
And by the way, I don't think --
QUESTION: What do you think the two courts below said, meant when they said that the 
employer could have shown that it would have engaged in this denial of the partnership 
anyway, but it didn't do it? What do you think they meant? 
MR. HELLER: I think they meant to say, show us some standards that you've written out, 
some history that's clear --
QUESTION: Right, right. Well, what if, what if the employer had come back and said, 
and proved to the satisfaction of the Court, would it have gone to liability? I would have 
supposed it would. 
MR. HELLER: I wouldn't have supposed it would, no. It would go because 706(g) says 
that if you prove discrimination affected the employment decision, that is, that is grounds 
for some relief. That is the first sentence. 
When you get to the second sentence, it says, however, there shall be no reinstatement or 
back pay if you show, if there was another reason. And that seems to me to be a very 
intelligent structuring of the way one deals with relief rather than liability. 
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QUESTION: And no reinstatement. 
MR. HELLER: And no reinstatement, If you make that showing by the necessary 
standard, which we've said should be [*33] clear and convincing. 
QUESTION: What about attorneys' fees? 
MR. HELLER: Excuse me. 
QUESTION: What about attorneys' fees? 
MR. HELLER: Attorneys' fees and a general injunction are declaratory judgment. That is 
correct --
QUESTION: Well, perhaps no attorneys' fees, if, there's only injunctive relief, says 
Hewitt against Helms. Right? 
MR. HELLER: Possibly, no attorneys' fees. But we would have though that that's a 
matter of, of analyzing to what extent you've succeeded on claims. 
QUESTION: Aren't most cases mixed motive situations, for example, even in McDonnell 
Douglas and Burdine, in a sense they are so-called mixed motives. You have to decide, 
the trier of fact has to choose between a legitimate reason and an illicit reason. Isn't that 
right? 
MR. HELLER: They are all that way until you get to the third stage and the trial Judge 
says, I find that this was either-or, and I believe this or that. 
QUESTION: Well, why didn't the trial court have to make such a finding here? 
MR. HELLER: Partly because of the complexity of the process that was going on here, 
and because I don't believe that there is anything that, in Title VII, that says you must say 
either-or, and this Court's decisions [*34] seem to say they're --
QUESTION: Well, wouldn't wouldn't the evidence of gender stereotyping go to the 
question of whether the interpersonal skills criteria of the employer was a pretext, in 
effect? 
MR. HELLER: Well --
QUESTION: Or was pretextual as applied here? 
MR. HELLER: Prof. Fiske's testimony went partly to the intensity as well as the kind of 
comments that were being said. 
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Yes, it goes to it, and that's another reason, that's another reason why it could be possibly 
come out as a pretext case. But it did not. 
Judge Gesell found there was some grounds for that, but when he looked at the nature of 
the comments of a very significant number of the objectors to this candidacy, and the way 
they were phrased, one the intensity, calling her potentially dangerous, nobody likes her, 
universally disliked, he then came to a conclusion, a very careful conclusion, that there 
was something of both here. 
QUESTION: Did he ever quantify that something? 
MR. HELLER: No. That seems to me to be the government's approach, and I think it's 
pretty much unquantifiable. 
Price Waterhouse does not run a counted vote system, and people aren't required to get 
up and explain their votes. So we're back [*35] with this problem that Arlington heights 
addresses. 
QUESTION: Well, that's pretty difficult when you combine that with Mt. Healthy. I 
mean, where are we on liability? 
MR. HELLER; I believe we are on liability --
QUESTION: And who has what burden? 
MR. HELLER: I believe we are on liability that she had met the burden of showing that it 
caused, in part, or was a significant, substantial factor, a motivating factor, that there may 
well have been another factor. 
Now the question I think is to say, how much relief, what relief, if any, is she entitled to 
in the circumstances. 
QUESTION: Do you have any support for the clear and convincing standard that the 
court shifted ever to the employer? 
MR. HELLER: What we think the support is is the common law principles of making the 
person who has been found to have had at least one wrong motive disentangle from --
QUESTION: Any support from any of our cases? 
MR. HELLER: I don't think there is from any of your cases --
QUESTION: No. 
MR. HELLER: Any of the Court's cases in a discrimination or --
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QUESTION: Did the Plaintiff ever make out in the trial court a disparate impact claim 
under 703(a)(2)? 
MR. HELLER: No. I think Judge Gesell's [*36) footnote, which you'll find at page 60, is 
quite right. That seems to, seemed to us at the time, at least, to call for statistical proof, 
and I'm not sure Watson changes that. And we did not succeed on the statistics. 
So I don't think -- and, but we just don't think Title VII gets boxed that way, so that 
7(a)(2) is, 703(a)(2) is disparate impact and not disparate treatment as well. In other 
words, the statute does not work in these nice cubby holes that way. 
So what we do believe, if the clear and convincing is perhaps the one point where we 
think we are well out beyond the decisions of this Court, is that that is the proper solution 
to a case in which there is a kind of smog over a motivation now, because there have 
been two factors probably, and one of them is a forbidden one. 
And that the employer has the records, the employer has the history, the employer has a 
knowledge of its own motives. It ought to be able to make a clear and convincing case. 
It should be able to do that by pointing to history, it should be able to do that by pointing 
to a written standard, if that's so. But -- I'm sorry, Justice White. 
QUESTION: Oh, I wasn't -- I was thinking about something else entirely. [*37) 
MR. HELLER: Oh, excuse me. I thought I was burning you. 
But that, if one says that, I also think clear and convincing says something about the kind 
of proof that is wanted. We are, we are perhaps in the last analysis less concerned about 
the quantum than we are this Court Instructing lower courts that you've got to say 
something more than what, in the Teamsters it said were general affirmations of good 
faith. 
That's not where the case is now. You must come forward and say, we would have done 
this but for. And as to "but for" not one of those 87 male candidates, not one of them 
could have established that they were going to become partners but for a single factor in 
the world. 
Actually 4 7 did and 21 didn't. That is the kind of impossible burden of proof that will 
simply extinguish Title VII suits and collegial decision making would likely, by 
subjective standards, would likely become a very common form of practice, because it 
would be impenetrable. 
And that too, given the policy of the act, the history of the act, the defeat of the 
McClellan Amendment, with Senator Case, is a very clear statement about it. 
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The 1972 amendment, when this Court said that a new statute that said, [*38] any 
discrimination is, violates this act, and said that is assimilated to the standards under old 
Title VII. 
All of that, we think, argues for saying, liability is not a demanding standard, or 
anywhere near the demanding standard that Price Waterhouse insists. Remedy is where 
they may be able to show that they did something that should not have a consequence of 
the sort that we ask for in the complaint in this case. 
If there are no other questions, I will then sit down. 
QUESTION: Thank your, Mr. Heller. Ms. Oberly, you have four minutes remaining. 
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KATHRYN A.OBERLY ON BEHALF OF THE 
PETITIONER 
MS. OBERLY: There are just two points I'd like to address, Your Honor. 
The first is Plaintiffs contention that our position puts an impossible burden of proof on 
the Plaintiff in a Title VII action. That's simply not the case. 
This Court in Burdine recognized that the Plaintiff has full access to the EEOC's 
investigatory files, as well as to discovery in a civil case. And this case bell bears that out, 
because by the time this case went to trial, Plaintiff knew as much about Price 
Waterhouse's decision-making process as Price Waterhouse itself knobs. She was not 
laboring [*39] under any handicap. And to make her prove her case is simply not unfair. 
The second point I'd like to address is Plaintiffs theory that the way to deal with this class 
of cases is to draw a distinction between liability and remedy. 
That distinction does not work and does not make sense in the type of case Plaintiff 
brought, of an individual disparate treatment claim. If she succeeds in proving causation 
in that type of claim, then she's entitled to full relief. 
You may need to measure, you may need to have quantification on the amount of back 
pay. You may need to work out the specifics of the relief. But there's no doubt that she 
gets full relief. 
On the other hand, it she cant, establish causation, there is no justification, and in fact 
there are serious Article III problems with giving her partial relief, Article III problems 
giving her an injunction when she's no longer there to enforce it, when she hasn't brought 
a class action, and there are no other women who can show that they're affected by Price 
Waterhouse's future conduct. 
And you certainly would not give her attorneys' fees for establishing a process violation 
when she can't show that that process harmed her. 
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So that [*40] the liability/remedy dichotomy that the Plaintiff is urging the Court to 
adopt makes sense in a different type of Title VII case. 
It makes sense in disparate impact cases, it makes sense in class action cases, it makes 
sense in pattern or practice cases, where the liability showing does not require the 
establishment of "but for" causation, and you leave to a separate remedy stage whether 
particular individuals have been harmed and should be the beneficiaries of specific relief, 
such as reinstatement or back pay. 
But in her type of case, those inquiries merge into the liability determination, And if she 
can't get over the liability hurdle, you simply don't reach the remedial phase of the case. 
Thank you. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Ms. Oberly. The case is submitted. 
(Whereupon, at 2:41 o'clock p.m., the case in the above-entitled matter was submitted.) 
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